

Message Text

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TO WHITE HOUSE IMMEDIATE

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FOR PRESIDENT AND DR BRZEZINSKI

FOL TEL SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO ANKARA FROM USDEL SECRETARY
AIRCRAFT DTD 22 JAN 1978 QTE

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (VANCE, CYRUS)

SUBJECT: MEETINGS IN ANKARA, JANUARY 20-21

PASS WHITE HOUSE FOR PRESIDENT AND DR. BRZEZINSKI

1. I FOUND IN ANKARA AN ACTIVIST NEW GOVERNMENT JUST
PULLING ITSELF TOGETHER AND REVIEWING A NUMBER OF
PROBLEMS, DOMESTIC AND FOREIGN, WITH THE OBJECT OF
MOVING THEM FORWARD. A NUMBER OF THEIR POLICY LINES,
OF COURSE, WERE FAMILIAR ONES, BUT THERE IS A SEARCH
FOR FRESH APPROACHES. ECEVIT WANTS TO IMPROVE
TURKISH-U.S. RELATIONS, BUT THERE IS STILL A STRONG
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FEELING THAT US POLICY OVER THE YEARS HAS BEEN
MARKED BY A STRONG GREEK BIAS.

2. OUR TWO MEETINGS WERE ESSENTIALLY AN EXTENSIVE
EXCHANGE IN WHICH ECEVIT REVIEWED HS CONCERNS, DOUBTS,
SUSPICIONS, AND EXPECTATIONS AND I RESPONDED TO HIM.
THIS EXCHANGE COVERED U.S. TURKISH BILATERAL

RELATIONS, U.S. SOVIET RELATIONS, TURKEY'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS (INCLUDING GREECE AND THE USSR), CYPRUS, TURKEY'S ATTACHMENT TO DEMOCRACY. AND ECEVIT' VIEW THAT TURKEY IS INADEQUATELY COMPENSATED FOR ITS CONTRIBUTION TO THE BILATERAL SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S. AND TO NATO.

3. AS AN OUTGROWTH OF THE LATTER CONCERN, ECEVIT MADE TWO SPECIFIC, BUT NOT DETAILED, REQUESTS: THAT THE U.S. TURKISH DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT (DCA) SIGNED IN MARCH 1976 BE SUPPLEMENTED BY ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE; AND THAT WE EXPLORE MEANS OF BRINGING U.S. INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS IN TURKEY UNDER THE COVER OF A SALT AGREEMENT (IN ORDER TO REDUCE WHAT HE SEES AS THEIR POTENTIAL TO PROVOKE THE SOVIET UNION). I TOLD ECEVIT THAT HIS SUGGESTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DCA INTRODUCED COMPLEX AND DIFFICULT PROBLEMS AND EXPLAINED THAT REOPENING DISCUSSION OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD SERIOUSLY COMPLICATE CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATION. CONCERNING THE INTELLIGENCE INSTALLATIONS I SAID I WOULD EXPLORE HIS IDEA - AS A TECHNICAL QUESTION - BUT THAT IF SOMETHING WERE POSSIBLE IN THIS REGARD IT COULD NOT BE UNTIL SALT III.

4. OUR DISCUSSIONS ON CYPRUS AND TURKISH-GREEK RELATIONS YIELDED NOTHING NEW. ECEVIT REPEATED HIS RECENT STATEMENTS THAT HE IS DETERMINED TO RESOLVE THE
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STATEMENTS THAT HE IS DETERMINED TO RESOLVE THE CYPRUS PROBLEM BECAUSE IT IS IN TURKEY'S INTEREST TO DO SO, THAT THE TURKISH CYPRIOT SIDE IS PREPARED TO TAKE THE INITIATIVE BY PREPARING NEW PROPOSALS ON TERRITORY AND THE CONSTITUTION, THAT HE AND TURK CYPRIOT LEADER DENKTASH ARE IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT , AND THAT TURKS ARE COMMITTED TO CONCEPT OF FEDERATION RATHER THAN A BIZONAL STATE AND ARE OPPOSED TO PARTITION. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE HE SAID THE GREEK CYPRIOTS SHOULD NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH ON TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENT (IMPLYING LESS THAN HE HAD BEEN PREPARED TO GIVE IN 1974), AND THAT FREEDOM OF SETTLEMENT ACROSS COMMUNAL LINES IS UNREALISTIC WHILE FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT COULD BE WORKED OUT GRADUALLY OVER THE COURSE OF A FEW YEARS. ECEVIT ALSO REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT TURKEY AND GREECE MUST BE INVOLVED IN ANY SETTLEMENT ALTHOUGH NOT NECESSARILY DIRECTLY INVOLVED. CONCERNING LINKAGE BETWEEN THE CYPRUS AND AEGEAN PROBLEMS, ECEVIT REPEATED HIS BELIEF THAT THEY SHOULD BE DEALT WITH SEPARATELY BUT SIMULTANEOUSLY.

5. THE THEME OF ECEVIT'S COMMENTS ON GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS WAS THAT IF LEFT TO THEMSELVES GREECE AND

TURKEY COULD SOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS. HE SAID AS LONG AS GREECE HAS THE IMPRESSION THAT IT ENJOYS ONE - SIDED SUPPORT OF THE U.S. AND OTHER NATO ALLIES SUCH AS FRANCE AND ENGLAND, IT WILL NOT BE INCLINED TO RESOLVE ITS PROBLEMS WITH TURKEY . I ASSURED HIM THAT, WHILE WE WANTED TO SEE THE PROBLEM SOLVED, WE ARE PREPARED TO LEAVE IT IN THE HANDS OF SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM AND THE PARTIES TO THE DISPUTE.

6. ECEVIT REPEATED HIS INTEREST IN ESTABLISHING A HIGH-LEVEL POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH GREEK PRIME MINISTER CARAMANLIS BUT SAID HE REALIZED IT IS NECESSARY TO LAY THE GROUNDWORK FOR SUMMIT MEETINGS. HE NOTED THAT CARAMANLIS IS AT THE PEAK OF HIS CAREER AND OFTER HE
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GOES IT MAY BE TOO LATE TO SOLVE GREEK-TURKISH BILATERAL PROBLEMS; THEREFORE, THE PRESENT OPPORTUNITY SHOULD NOT BE LOST -- A THOUGHT WHICH CARAMANLIS HIMSELF STATED AT OUR PRIVATE DINNER IN ATHENS LATER.

7. ECEVIT EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT THE TRADITIONAL MILITARY BALANCE BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY HAD BEEN UPSET, AND UNTIL THIS SITUATION IS CORRECTED GREECE WILL NOT BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE A SERIOUS DIALOGUE WITH TURKEY. HE SPENT MORE TIME TALKING ABOUT U.S.-TURKISH MILITARY COOPERATION THAN ANY OTHER SINGLE SUBJECT. IT WAS CLEAR THAT ECEVIT IN REVIEWING TURKEY'S SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH US WAS THINKING IN TERMS OF WHAT HE SEES AS A CHANGING GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT. SPECIFICALLY, HE SEEMS TO FEEL THAT THE GROWING DETENTE BETWEEN THE U.S. AND USSR CREATES A NEED FOR TURKEY TO MIND MORE CAREFULLY ITS OWN RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. IN HIS PRESENTATION TO ME HE ALSO SAID HE WANTED TO DISASSOCIATE, INsofar AS POSSIBLE, THE US-TURKISH MILITARY RELATIONSHIP FROM GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEMS. HE SAID HE REALIZED THE DIFFICULTY OF SUCH DISASSOCIATION, BUT HE EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT AT LEAST INOFFICIAL US STATEMENTS THE TWO SUBJECTS WOULD NOT BE LINKED. I TOLD HIM FRANKLY THAT THE MATTER OF THE DCA AND CYPRUS WERE LINKED IN THE MINDS OF MANY OF THE CONGREESS.

8. HE THEN SEPARATED THE "ARMS EMBARGO" FROM THE DCA. THE FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, HE SAID, SHOULD BE TO FIND SOME WAY OF LIFTING THE EMBARGO. AFTER THAT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO INVESTIGATE THE "POSITIVE POSSIBILITIES" OF THE DCA. HE SAID THAT, SINCE THE DCA HAD BEEN SIGNED IN A MARCH 1976, SEVERAL THINGS HAVE HAPPENED WHICH SUGGEST A NEED TO REVIEW THAT DOCUMENT. FIRST WAS AN INCREASE IN THE ARMANMENTS OF THE
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COUNTRIES SURROUNDING TURKEY (MOST OF WHICH WERE SUPPLIED BY THE US HE SAID). SECOND, THE DEPRECIATION OF THE DOLLAR AND THE RAPIDLY RISING COST OF ARMS HAVE ERODED THE VALUE OF THE DCA. AND THIRD, THE TURKISH CONTRIBUTION TO THE MUTUAL DEFENSE RELATIONSHIP ENVISAGED IN THE DCA WAS IMMEASURABLY LARGER THAN THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE US. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT REWRITING IT MIGHT BE DIFFICULT AND TAKE TOO MUCH TIME. I TOLD HIM WE ANTICIPATE CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS IN MARCH.

9. ECEVIT THEN TURNED TO HIS PREOCCUPATION WITH TURKEY'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT TURKEY DID NOT WANT, DURING THIS PERIOD OF DETENTE, TO BE PROVOCATIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION. HE SAID THAT IN HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SOVIET LEADERS HE HAD BEEN MADE AWARE THAT THEY CONSIDERED THE US "OBSERVATION INSTALLATIONS" IN TURKEY TO BE POTENTIALLY PROVOCATIVE IF REACTIVATED. ECEVIT SAID HE RECOGNIZED HIS RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ALLIANCE AND THE WORLD TO COOPERATE IN GAINING THE INFORMATION THAT THESE INSTALLATIONS PROVIDED. HOWEVER, HE WONDERED IF IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE FOR US TO CONSIDER SOME WAY OF INCLUDING THESE INSTALLATIONS IN A SALT AGREEMENT. HE SAID THAT THIS MIGHT MAKE THESE INSTALLATIONS LESS PROVOCATIVE TO THE SOVIET UNION AND THEREFORE LESS OF A BURDEN FOR TURKEY.

10. A RECURRING ELEMENT WAS ECEVIT'S INTEREST IN GETTING US HELP ON TURKEY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS. I TOLD HIM THAT I WOULD DISCUSS WHAT WE COULD DO WITH MIKE BLUMENTHAL AFTER MY RETURN TO WASHINGTON AND WOULD BE BACK IN TOUCH AND PRESSED HIM TO GET US HIS RESPONSE TO THE IMF. I ALSO SAID THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED AFTER RECEIVING HIS MATERIAL THE IMF TO USE OUR GOOD OFFICES. HOWEVER, HE IS ALSO INTERESTED IN BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. I POINTED OUT THAT THIS YEAR'S AID BILL WAS FINISHED. HE ASKED ABOUT SECURITY ASSISTANCE; I TOLD HIM IT WAS TOO LATE FOR THIS AS WELL.

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11. ECEVIT STRESSED HIS CONCERN THAT WE WERE NOT TAKING SERIOUSLY ENOUGH THE TURKISH-GREEK AEGEAN DISPUTE. HE SAID THAT WE HAD NEVER OBJECTED TO GREECE'S ARMING OF THE AEGEAN ISLANDS OFF TURKEY'S COAST, WHICH IS CONTRARY TO TREATY. I CORRECTED HIM, NOTING THAT WE HAD TAKEN UP THIS MATTER DIRECTLY WITH THE GREEKS

AND HAD EXPRESSED OUR CONCERN.

12. WE CONCLUDED BY AGREEING THAT WE SHOULD AIM FOR A MORE DETAILED DISCUSSION OF THE BILATERAL ISSUES WE HAD TOUCHED ON ABOUT MID-FEBRUARY.

13. I THINK IT WAS USEFUL TO MAKE EARLY CONTACT WITH ECEVIT. HIS WILL CLEARLY BE A GOVERNMENT THAT WILL BE LAUNCHING A SERIES OF NEW INITIATIVES, AND LIFE WILL BE EASIER FOR US IF WE CAN STAY IN CLOSE CONTACT.
VANCE UNQTE CHRISTOPHER

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